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Waste generation and landfill diversion dynamics:
decentralised management and spatial effects
An analysis of economic and policy transitions
Massimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini & Francesco Nicolli1

Abstract

This paper provides analyses of municipal waste generation and landfill diversion dynamics based on a 8-years panel
dataset for Italy covering 103 provinces. Although absolute declining for waste generation is a long way off, there are some
first signals of increasing relative delinking and robust average landfill diversion. Spatial effects seem to be negligible,
probably due to the strong decentralisation of waste management and policies: local, economic, policy and structural
factors contribute to explaining the waste dynamics. Though North-South waste performances are showing some signals
of convergence, greater efforts towards convergence of waste performances in a decentralised policy scenario are needed.
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1. Introduction
Indicators

of

‘decoupling/delinking’

are

used

to

measure

improvements

in

environmental/resource efficiency with respect to economic activity. The European Union’s (EU)
‘thematic strategies’ on resources and waste, include reference to ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ delinking
indicators (European Commission, 2003a,b; Jacobsen et al., 2004), the former being a negative
relationship between economic growth and environmental impacts while the latter being a positive
but decreasing in size relationship. The achievement of some degree delinking is of prime
importance for waste (Figure 1), given that the EU evidence (EEA, 2009) shows an absence of even
relative delinking (for illustrative purposes see also Figure 2). The European Environmental Agency
(EEA, 2007) acknowledges that volumes in the EU are growing, driven by changing production and
consumption patterns (see also Andersen et al., 2007), and highlights (EEA, 2006) the importance of
flexible implementation of market-based instruments, within a decentralised approach to
environmental policy in the EU, to achieve a stronger degree of delinking in (regionally
decentralised) waste indicators. Policy endogeneity and spatial phenomena are interrelated and are
very important for achieving waste targets thorough effective (diffusion) of policies in the territory.
In this paper we address these aspects as key elements in the assessment of delinking and policy
effectiveness, which are intertwined in the decentralised policy settings typical of the EU and the
US. Italy is a country with high levels of decentralisation in environmental policy making, which is
moving towards an even stronger federal set up; moreover it is characterised by major income
differences between its northern and southern regions, and historically quite different economic and
environmental performance. Divergence or convergence in current and future waste performances
is a key issue that is receiving renewed attention since the collapse in 2008-2009, of the waste
managements schemes (both practically and financially) in Naples and Palermo.i This issue is of
great interest given that on the one hand countries are monitored and valued on the basis of their
national average performance, and on the other hand that regional system collapses are covered
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financially by national taxes. Italy also may provide an interesting case study for informing policy
and waste management schemes in other highly decentralised and heterogeneous environmentsii.
Figure 1 : The income–environment relationship

Figure 2: Projected generation and landfilling of municipal waste in the EU25

Source: EEA (2007), Figures from 1980-2004 are data from Eurostat. Figures from 2005-2020 are projections. BMW
(Bio degradable Municipal waste)

Theoretically, policy decentralisation may have a positive effect on waste generation via reduction
and better waste management performance, based on greater flexibility and specificity in policy
implementation, which may be able to take account of local idiosyncratic costs and benefits related
to policy (Pearce, 2004). Although decentralisation may improve policy implementation in the EU,
including policies for waste prevention, it may have some drawbacks in terms of exploitation of local
rents by public and private agents. In principle, rents are neither good nor bad in the environmental
4
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realm. What matters are their effects on static and dynamic elements such as value creation and
innovation. Waste ‘markets’, such as land-filling and even recycling, may be associated with rents
that could lock a local system in to less than optimal equilibrium. This aspect requires further
research.
The high heterogeneity of income and environmental performance makes it necessary to study the
dynamic evolution of policy implementation and spatial dependence regarding the waste trends that
emerge at regional and provincial levels. In this paper we focus on the provincial level, exploiting
socio-economic and environmental data for a large number of provinces (103), over a fairly long
dynamic path (8 years), from 1999 to 2006, where there has been drastic change in municipal waste
policies and waste management.

Figure 3. Landfilled waste per area in Italian provinces (tons per km2, 2006)
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Figure 4. Share of separate collection in Italian provinces (%, 2006)
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature, highlighting works
that deal with delinking, policy effectiveness and spatial analyses. Section 3 presents the research
hypotheses, the empirical model and the data source. Section 4 discusses the panel regression results
for waste generation and landfill diversion, and then presents the tests for potential spatial
correlation. Section 5 concludes, offering policy recommendations for effective decentralised
management of waste.

2. The relevant literature
Despite the environmental, policy and economic significance of waste issues, there is very little
empirical evidence on delinking, even for major waste streams such as the municipal one and
packaging. Analyses of policy effectiveness are similarly scarce. Existing work is largely oriented
towards the optimisation of waste management or evaluation of externalities, regarding landfill and
6
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other waste disposal strategies, with a very few purely theoretical analyses of waste management and
landfill management (Calcott and Walls, 2005; Daskalopoulos et al., 1998; Andre and Cerda, 2004;
Ozawa, 2005). The stronger focus on cost benefit analyses of specific waste streams and policy
packages (Pearce, 2004), and landfill siting decisions aimed at resolving the NIMBY (not in my
backyard) problem (Quah and Yong, 2007), in part is due to lack of reliable panel data, which is
extremely scarce at sub-country level.
Some macro level evidence, based on cross country regression analysis of data from the 1980s, is
presented in World Bank (1992). More recent reports (DEFRA/DTI, 2003) provide evidence of
positive elasticities between waste generation and income being of primary policy concern. Waste
generation seems still to be characterised by a strict relationship between economic drivers and
environmental pressures.
A study by Cole et al. (1997) finds no evidence of an inverted U-shape in relation to municipal
waste. Cole and colleagues use data on municipal waste for the period 1975-90, for 13 OECD
countries; their findings revealed no turning point (TP), and they find environmental indicators
(municipal waste generation) monotonically increasing with income over the observed range.
Similarly, Seppala et al. (2001), in a study of five industrialised countries including Japan, the US and
Germany, and covering a similar period (1970-1994), find no evidence of delinking regarding direct
material flows too. However, Fischer-Kowalski and Amann (2001), analysing the richer OECD
countries, find that the intensity of material input with respect to GDP shows relative, but not
absolute delinking, with material growth over 1975-1995 for all countries. They note that absolute
delinking holds for landfilled waste, but not for waste generated.
There is some evidence of delinking. For example, Leigh (2004), which uses a waste/consumption
indicator derived from the environmental sustainability indexes (ESI), and Berrens et al. (1998) and
Wang et al. (1998), who find evidence of a negative elasticity for US stocks of hazardous waste as an
environmental impact indicator, based on a county-based cross sectional dataset.
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A study by Johnstone and Labonne (2004) uses panel data on solid waste in the OECD countries
to provide evidence on the economic and demographic determinants of rates of household solid
waste generation, regressed over consumption expenditure, urbanisation and population density.
They find positive elasticities, but lower than 1, in the range 0.15 to 0.69. Few studies include waste
policy analyses. The study by Karousakis (2006), which deals with policy evaluation, presents
evidence on the determinants of waste generation and the driving forces behind the proportions of
paper/glass recycled, and the proportion of waste that goes to land-fill. She finds for OECD that
municipal solid waste (MSW) increases monotonically with income and that urbanisation exerts an
even stronger effect on waste generation, while the time-invariant policy index is not significant. At
country level, Mazzanti et al (2008) analyze waste generation dynamics, showing that only the richest
provinces are close to a turning point in the waste income relationship, with strong north south gaps
and an effective role of waste management systems like tariffs, which are nevertheless associated to
endogeneity with respect to income.
Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009), based on panel data for a group of European countries, finds also
neither absolute nor relative delinking, for municipal or packaging waste for 1995-2000 and 19972000 respectively. Estimated elasticities of waste generation with respect to household consumption
are close to unity.
In terms of the main landfill oriented works, the focus, as already indicated, has been on costbenefit analyses and landfill siting decisions, due in part to the lack of reliable country level and
within country data (Pearce, 2004). Some scholars have attempted to evaluate the EU landfill
Directive and the implementation in the UK of a landfill tax in 1996. Some of this work is informed
by a specific evaluation of the externalities. Given the lack of hard data, these studies present
interesting but only qualitative assessments. During the first phase of the UK landfill tax
implementation, Morris et al. (1998) investigated its potential contribution to sustainable waste
management, analysing its general structure, comparative landfill costs and the waste hierarchy.
Morris and Read (2001), Burnley (2001), Davies and Doble (2004) provide additional qualitative
8
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evidence. Phillips et al. (2007) is a UK specific regional assessment of waste strategies, but regional
based analyses are still rare.
The works discussed above sometimes touch on the spatial (dependence) factors that may impact
on environmental performance spatial phenomena, have been prominent in analyses of waste siting
(Jenkins et al., 2004; Miranda et al., 2000; Ley et al., 2002). This rather specific stream of wasterelated works includes studies of mainly Scandinavian and UK experience, due mostly to the lack of
data for most countries. Hage et al. (2008) investigate the main drivers of rates of collection of
household plastic packaging waste in certain Swedish municipalities, using spatial econometrics for a
cross section of 282 units. They find that spatial issues (collection is positively correlated for
neighbouring municipalities) and policy levers (weight based waste fees), are relevant (see also Hage
et al., 2009; Hage 2008). Our analysis is much more general; it focuses on an entire country and 103
provinces rather than a sample of municipalities, and covers a quite long period. This enables better
integration of economic, environmental, policy and spatial issues in a more dynamic scenario.
The literature on waste determinants referred to above, underlines that waste indicators generally
tend to increase with income or other economic drivers such as population, and that, in general, full
delinking is not supported by the data. A decreasing trend (negative elasticity) may be found in
industrialised countries where waste management and policies are more developed. Nevertheless, the
risk is that bell shapes (absolute delinking) are associated with only a few rich countries or areas, and
can be divisive in terms of countries’ waste performance indicators (Mazzanti and Montini, 2009).

3. Research hypotheses and data sources
In order to embed waste generation and landfill diversion dynamics in socio-economic, geographic
and policy regional contexts we exploit a rich vector of explanatory variables that enhance the
conceptual model that is used for applied investigations of delinking (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004,
2008; Cole at al., 1997). We here summarise the hypotheses with respect to landfill diversion and
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waste generation in terms of the expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and
offer a descriptive sketch of the variables.
First, we verify delinking and the eventual non-linearity (bell shape) in the income-waste
relationship. For waste generation, we expect either a linear relationship with eventual relative
delinking, or a (to our knowledge never found) a reasonable TP. In the case of landfill diversion,
since in the EU and Italy a decreasing trend started in 1995-1997, we expect either a negative
relationship, or a U shape if performance has deteriorated.
Second, we examine the expected effects of socio-economic and structural variables, mainly
population density and tourist flows. Population density may be negatively or positively linked to
waste generation. We would expect to find the latter effect, especially based on the findings in the
literature. In more densely populated areas, only economies of scale spurred by urbanisation could
invert this trend and reduce waste generation. Regarding landfill diversion, we definitely expect a
negative linking, on the basis of the studies reviewed above, and on the joint role of higher
economic opportunity costs of land and harsher environmental externalities in urban areas. Tourist
flows per capita are a nice structural control for countries like Italy. Waste generation could be
spurred by tourist flows. However, we could also expect that in the most popular tourist areas,
diversion might be driven down in favour of incineration or recycling for the same reasons as in the
case of population density, that is, high local economic and environmental opportunity costs.
Third, we check the role of decentralised policy-related variables. In both cases (waste generation
and landfill diversion), we expect policy variables to drive down the income-environment
relationship. Recent work shows that policy endogeneity with respect to income needs to be
considered and could lead – at least in the short run - to a positive correlation between policy
stringency and waste performance, mediated by income. The waste management/policy proxies
considered are: (a) share of separately collected waste, which we consider to be a policy element
associated with waste management; (b) share of provincial municipalities and provincial population
affected by the new ‘waste tariff’ regime, which replaces the previous ‘waste tax’ regime.iii The tariff
10
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should move waste management towards full-cost pricing/polluter pays principle (PPP) based
system;iv (c) percentage of waste management costs covered by the tariff; and (d) main
environmental tax in the waste realm, the landfill tax, implemented at regional level in Italy.
Fourth, in the landfill diversion analyses we control for provincial ‘investment choices’ in landfill
and incineration, by including incinerated waste per capita and number of landfill sites per area
(km2), and number of incineration plants per area (km2). We aim to test for the existence of lock in
dynamic effects when a province decides to invest in a single main disposal option.
Finally, we implement a proper spatial analysis to test for the spatial autocorrelation of waste
generation and landfill diversion at provincial level, by setting up contiguity and distance weight
matrixes (see Section 4.2). We investigate three short time periods (1999-2000, 2002-2003 and 20052006], to verify whether spatial correlation is relevant and if its eventual presence and effect on
waste drivers has changed over time. This test has some methodological and policy implications.
The absence of a clear spatial correlation could be interpreted as lack of policy cooperation within a
regional area with similar income levels, with single provinces behaving independently as far as waste
policy implementation is concerned. This evidence should be taken in conjunction with evidence on
the performance of the entire system and that of regional subsystems, since spatially correlated
performance data are not preferable to non-correlated performance data.
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Table 1: Descriptive analysis and research hypothesis
Acronym
MSW-GEN
LANDWASTE

Variable description
MSW yearly generated
(kg per capita)
MSW yearly generated
and landfilled (kg per
capita)

VA

Provincial yearly value
added
per
capita
(€2000)

DENSITY

Mean

Min

Max

520.28

251.91

893.24

Dependent variable

Research hypothesis

325.4

0

1898.47

Dependent variable
Positively correlated with income,
the objective is assessing whether
relative or absolute delinking is
present
Positive and negative correlations
may emerge depending on factors
such as economies of scale and
land opportunity costs in urban and
densely inhabited areas

17,718.22

9,369.12

28,796.07

Population/surface
(inhabitants/km2)

244.76

22.99

2,640.92

SEPCOLLECT

Share of separated
collection (%)

19.32

0.03

67.57

Negatively affecting landfilled waste
per capita

TOURISM

Annual
presence

3,337,308

91,033

3,200,000

Positively affecting MSW generated
Negatively affecting landfilled waste
per capita

10.53

0

101.72

6.01

0

100

0.0000226

0

0.0000472

0.0000111

0

0.0000454

50.57

0

581.81

TAR-POP

TAR-MUN
INCper AREA
LANDper
AREA
INCINERATE
D

touristic

Share of population
living in municipalities
that introduced a waste
tariff substituting the
former waste tax (%)
Share of municipalities
that introduced a waste
tariff substituting the
former waste tax (%)
Number incinerator
plants /surface (km2)
Number landfill
sites/surface (km2)
MSW yearly incinerated
(kg per capita)

LANDFILL
TAX

Regional Landfill Tax
(€/kg)

0.01

0.005

0.02

NORD

Dummy, =1 if the
province is in the North

0.44

0

1

ISLAND

Dummy, =1 if the
province is in the
Islands
(Sicily and
Sardinia)

0.12

0

1

SOUTH

Dummy, =1 if the
province is in the South

0.18

0

1

Possibly reducing MSW generation
through indirect feed back effects,
though the direct effect is at waste
management
level.
Possible
endogeneity given the positive
correlation with respect to income.
Negatively affecting landfilled waste
per capita
This may be a proxy for
technological lock-in
Negatively affecting landfilled waste
per capita
Possibly reducing MSW generation,
incrementing the relative cost of
landfilling.

Different areas of the country show
very different economic and
institutional performance. These
differences may be reflected in
different amounts of waste
generated and landfilled.

The data are derived from the rich regional/provincial information available from the Italian
Environment Agency’s waste reports (APAT, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007), produced
according to Eurostat and EEA guidelines.
12
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The APAT dataset includes data on MSW generated and landfilled in all the Italian Provinces (103
distributed over 20 regions) and covers the period 1999-2006. It also provides information on waste
tariff diffusion, landfill taxes and separated collection. We merge these data with official data on
provincial level economic and other drivers. Although consumption is often used as a driver in
analyses of waste trends (Andersen et al., 2007), we have only regional not provincial level data on
consumption; thus, value added is the only reliable economic driver available. Finally, other socio
economic factors are derived from national and regional official datasets available from the Italian
statistical agency (ISTAT). Merging of all these data produces a fully balanced panel of 8 years and
824 observations, that as far as we know possess great value at international level for variable
richness, cross province heterogeneity, and dynamic extension.

4. The model and empirical evidence
After discussion of the model, we comment on the empirical evidence addressing first waste
generation (4.1) and landfill diversion drivers (4.2), and second investigating the relevance and nature
of spatial phenomena (4.3). Finally (4.4), we present a convergence analysis aimed at showing
whether Italy although showing drastically different waste performance in the south and weak signs
of spatial correlation, is characterised by a catching up of the poorer less performing regions.
We estimate a model by specifying the following general panel based reduced form. Given the
nature of data (and Hausman test outcomes - not shown), we opt for fixed effect LSDV (least
square dummy variable) estimations which account for individual fixed effects by including N-1
dummies. Linking to the comments above, we tackle the potential endogenous nature of waste
management factors, depending on simultaneity and ‘measurement errors’v of some variables, by
lagging or instrumenting.

(1) Log(MSW-GEN per capita) or LAND-WASTE per capita = αt + β1log (value added per capita)it +
β2log(structural factors)it + β3log(environmental policy factors) it + β4(other factors) it + εit
13
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The (vector of) coefficient(s) β2, refers to factors that are added to the core specification and
possible additional drivers of waste generation, such as population density and tourist flows. We add
each variable separately to the core specification, which includes value added and population density.
β3 refers to waste policies tested in the analysis, that are in logarithmic forms when it is possible.vi

4.1. Waste generation drivers
In order to take account of the presence of heteroschedasticity and temporal correlation among
individual drivers, we further cluster-corrected the traditional fixed effects LSDV.vii These results are
presented in Table 2 below.viii First, the core income-waste relationship appears to be linearly
shaped.ix This evidence confirms the scientific evidence and the findings of institutional reports that
reducing waste generation is a major challenge. Even a decade of waste (management) policies has
not drastically affected the relationship. Nevertheless, we note that the elasticity is well below unity.
Relative delinking, then, is present, which is an improvement on the unitary elasticity that many –
somewhat older - works highlight. Product eco-innovations, environmental household behaviour
and waste management actions may be responsible for this change from delinking into the current
relative delinking. The other key driver, population density, has the expected positive sign,
confirming other evidence for the EU (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009): economies of scale in waste
management do not exert potential impacts in densely urbanised areas. Even tourist flows, the other
structural factor, show the expected positive sign. Touristic provinces plausibly face stronger
challenges and possibly need differentiated financing schemes and stricter waste management and
disposal policy.x
Second, we add to the core specification the main waste management/policy factors for which we
have sufficient data. We note that the inclusion of additional covariates does not affect income and
population density elasticities. Of these (separated collection, diffusion of waste tariffs, landfill tax),
only separated collection is statistically significant. Waste tariffs show a weaker significance overall
14
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and are partially model dependent, while landfill tax is not (TAR-POP is significant, TAR-MUN is
not). The latter results are expected given the distance between the instrument, the landfill tax, and
the target (waste generation), as noted by EEA (2009). The positive coefficients related to separate
collection and waste tariffs recall the endogeneity issue, and the fact that policy actions and
commitment at local level can be partially explained by local institutional and economic factors.
Certain some institutional local factors unfortunately are not observable (e.g. environmental
activism, social capital, political stability, and green party turnovers).xi However, income can be a
policy driver in a dynamic setting where environmental quality is a luxury and local public agents are
challenged by stronger environmental preferences and have more resources (taxes) to invest in waste
management. Nevertheless, it is evident that this result is a coherent with the fact that policy efforts
are directed towards achieving better waste management rather than reducing waste at source. All
EU and national targets have been set in terms of recovery and recycling, given the amount of
waste, and only in the new 2008 waste framework directive timid signals of waste generation targets
are proposed for future years (EEA, 2009).
Finally, we present the econometric exercises to cope with endogeneity. We deal with SEPCOLLEC, TAR-POP and TAR-MUN in different ways: lagging one year, instrumenting the
covariate with VA or the first lag of the same variable (the regressions results are presented in Table
A.1 in the appendix). Across the three cases, the evidence for SEP-COLLECT and TAR-POP is
stable: the coefficients are highly significant with positive signs.xii TAR-MUN is significant only
when its instrument is VA. We can say that our basic evidence is fairly robust.

4.2 Landfill diversion drivers
We comment on the main evidence from the model that specifies the dependent variable – waste
landfilled per capita - in non-log form.xiii Table 3, following the reasoning mentioned above, presents
the results of the fixed effect LSDV estimations with cluster correction. As in the case of waste
generation, the relationship with income is linear, but with the expected negative sign. Population
15
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density, confirming as noted above other evidence for the EU, is linked to a negative and very
significant coefficient.xiv In our view, this is a structural factor that recalls economic rationales: the
significance of density and urban population, which above are positively correlated to waste
generation, is as expected, and shows that where opportunity costs are higher (in urban, and densely
populated areas) and disamenities/external effects influence more people, landfill diversion is
stronger. For example, in situations where the value of land is especially high and population density
is reaching world peaks, such as in Asia, landfill studies proliferate (Lang, 2005, Ozawa, 2005). Also,
anecdotal evidence shows that Milan closed its landfill in 2003 for reasons related to environmental
externalities and because of the very high economic opportunity costs deriving from the constraints
to land development stemming from the presence of a landfill site. Such factors could explain the
degree of delinking and landfill diversion in the endogenous scenario, even without policy
interventions. Economic rents may lead either to bad situations (Mafia manages illegal landfill sites
and thus is interested in maintaining a landfill based disposal system), or drive landfill diversion
(legal market rents linked to alternative developments). Economic development and legal rent
creation is thus another lever exploitable by public policy use at local level. The only unexpected
result is the non-significance of tourism in explaining the reduction of landfilled waste. One
hypothesis is that DENSITY probably captures much of the geographical heterogeneity, since
‘regional dummies’ are not significant.
The evidence related to waste management/policy covariates is interesting. SEP-COLLECT is
significant with an associated negative coefficient, and TAR-POP and TAR-MUN are significant
drivers of landfill diversion - the first showing a higher statistical significance: it is more effective at
provincial level at capturing population, since it focuses on more heavily populated areas, rather than
spreading the policy across all the municipalities involved. It is probably to be expected that urban
areas matter more for waste performance. Further works on this issue would be useful given the
transitional situation in the change from a tax to a tariff system.

16
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To sum up, the quite heterogeneous performance (between the North and South, and within the
North and South areas) we observe in Italy, based on the evidence from our analysis, depends on
economic-structural (VA; DENSITY) and waste management policy-related factors. Given the
strong decentralisation and idiosyncratic local nature of both economic and policy features, it
follows that waste performance is driven by elements operating at a very decentralised level, some
exogenous (DENSITY), others quite heavily influenced by local policy priorities and socio-political
preferences. This could explain the differences between North and South and across provinces in
areas of northern and southern Italy with similar levels of income.
Ultimately, we show that landfill tax is not effective, although this may depend on the time invariant
nature of our information, which is a minor flaw given that the tax is adjusted not yearly, but every
4-5 years. Not also that the not significant impact of landfill tax may be due not to its quite recent
implementation (the tax was formally introduced in 1996), but to its relatively low level compared to
other EU countries, and to ‘weak enforcement’ and slack implementation in some regions.xv
Nevertheless, even in the EU leading countries, such as the UK, some authors are doubtful about
the effectiveness of this instrument (Martin and Scott, 2003). Policy effectiveness in the
environmental and even more in the waste area, depends on the structure of the policy package
rather than on the individual instrument (EEA, 2009).
In terms of landfill diversion we investigate whether provinces that invest in the main alternative
disposal route, incineration, which may be more socially beneficial under some circumstances
(Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2004), show stronger landfill diversion. Using information on incinerated
waste per capita, we find a negative and significant effect on the amount of waste going to landfill.
Incinerating activity, where present, seems to be able to promote landfill diversion.
The Appendix includes a further robustness check for potential endogeneity. Across the three
considered cases, SEP-COLLECT and TAR-MUN are significant, while TAR-POP is generally only
slightly significant (see Table A2).
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Table 2: Waste Generated - drivers
Variables

Waste Generated – Log Log Model – Cluster correction
3
4
5
3.926287***
-0.4126362
-0.7466809

CONSTANT

1
-0.9826795

2
-1.239424

VA

0.5378776***

0.4799152***

/2

0.5084183***

DENSITY

0.3838825***

0.2318264*

0.4291315***

0.3280365***

TOURISM

6
1.645581***

7
0.8638574*

0.5250006***

0.4584976***

0.5291237***

0.3620628***

0.0502183**

0.0603915***

0.11206***

SEP-COLLECT

0.0411589***

TAR-POP^

0.0004003**

TAR-MUN^
LANDFILL
TAX
NORTH^

0.0002832
0.0326485
-0.1805646***

ISLAND^

0.0194857

SOUTH^

-0.0929674*

N

824

824

824

824

Model3

824

824

824

REM4

REM

FEM
FEM
FEM
FEM
FEM
Signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. R2 presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.

2

Not included given that the correlation between VA and COLLECT is 0.77
In fixed effects models all the individual effects are significant. F test not shown.
4
Since landfill tax is a time invariant model a random effects model was used.
3
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Table 3: Waste Landfilled - drivers
Variables

Landfilled Waste – Lin Log Model – Cluster Correction
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

CONSTAN
T

7524***

7495.396***

4477.85***

5987.921***

5834.446***

3092.827***

7598.889***

3131.948***

7271.041***

VA

-333.98**

-340.5877**

-254.5681**

-241.760**

-244.3936***

-339.7764**

-262.028***

-301.2105***

DENSITY

-767.1***

-784.5001***

-616.6274***

-610.90***

-41.69647*

-770.1361***

-40.15741

-776.5502***

TOURISM
SEPCOLLECT
TAR-POP^

Not incl for
collinearity
-795.840***

12.76637
-24.93373**
-1.079003**

TAR-MUN^
LANDFILL
TAX

-2.028524*
39.69075
-965138.7**

INCarea^
NORTH^

-47.65389

ISLAND^

-35.65135

SOUTH^
INCINERA
TED^
N

-85.04208
-.3531898***
824

824

824

824

824

824

824

824

Model5
FEM
FEM
FEM
FEM
FEM
REM6
FEM
REM
Signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. R2 presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.

5
6

824
FEM

In fixed effects models all individual effects are significant. F test not shown.
Since landfill tax is a time invariant model a random effects model was used.
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4.3 Spatial analysis
Spatial econometric analysis of the main determinants of waste generation and waste disposal is
important if it can be argued that neighbouring provinces will exchange experience and, in this way,
influence each other’s policies and waste management behaviour. From an econometric point of
view, if such spatial interactions exist ordinary least square (OLS) methods produce parameter
estimates that are biased and inefficient and OLS regression models need to be replaced with
opportune spatial regression models.
Thus, we analyse and test spatial autocorrelation in Italian per capita landfilled waste and per capita
waste generation using yearly provincial values. The literal meaning of spatial autocorrelation is selfcorrelation (autocorrelation) of the observed values of a single attribute, according to the
geographical (spatial) ordering of these valuesxvi.
There are two kinds of spatial autocorrelation: positive, when the relationship between the value at a
location and the values of its neighbours is positive; or negative when the relationship is negative.
One class of spatial autocorrelation measures is given by Moran statistics.xvii Spatial autocorrelation
measures, such as Moran’s I, require a weights matrix that defines a local neighbourhood around
each geographic unit. The value at each unit is compared with the weighted average of the values of
its neighbours. Substantially, a weights file identifies the neighbours.
Weights can be constructed based on contiguity to the polygon boundary (shape) files, or calculated
from the distance between points (points in a point shape file or centroids of polygons)xviii. Formally,
the spatial weights matrix is an n x n positive matrix (W) which specifies “neighbourhood sets” for
each observation. In each row i, a non-zero element wij defines j as being a neighbourxix of i.
According to convention, an observation is not a neighbour to itself, so that the diagonal elements
are zero (wii = 0) (Anselin, 2002).
A second type of problem occurs when the spatial weights are based on a distance criterion, such that
two units i and j are defined as neighbours when the distance between them (or, for units of area
units, the distance between their centroids) is less than a given critical value. When there is a high
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degree of heterogeneity in the spatial distribution of points or in the areas of regions, there may be
no satisfactory critical distance. In those instances, a “small” distance will tend to yield a lot of
islands (or, unconnected observations). Also, a distance chosen to ensure that each unit has at least
one neighbour may result in an unacceptably large number of neighbours for the smaller units. A
common solution to this problem could be to constrain the neighbour structure to the k-nearest
neighbours, thereby precluding islands and forcing each unit to have the same number of
neighbours (Anselin, 2002).
A third issue may arise when the weights are based on “economic” distance or another general metric,
such as derived from a social network structure. Care must be taken to ensure that the resulting
weights are meaningful, finite and non-negative. In addition, the “zero-distance problem” must be
accounted for. This problem occurs when a distance measure, such as dij = |zi . zj |, becomes zero,
due to rounding problems or because two observations show identical socio-economic profiles. As a
result, inverse distance weights such as wij = 1/dij, are undefined.
Because it is also important to maintain the weights matrix as exogenous,xx in our analysis we do not
consider a weights matrix based on “economic” distance; thus we use: (i) a contiguity matrix (queen,
1st order); and (ii) a proximity matrix based on the distance between centroids (with minimum
threshold distance to ensure that each province has at least one neighbour).
Empirical results, according to the global Moran’s I statistic, suggest that the landfilling of MSW is
not strongly related to landfilling in neighbouring municipalities. Only for the years 1999, 2000 and
2006 (Table 4) the global Moran’s I statistic is slightly significant, but the ambivalent signs for those
three years and across the interval considered, suggest that there is not a definite and significant
spatial pattern. Moreover, the empirical results are not invariant with respect to the weight matrix
used. In fact spatial autocorrelation for landfilled waste and the three years referred to above occurs
if we consider only one of the weight matrixes (contiguity or proximity).
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Table 4. Moran’s I for landfilled waste and waste generation for several years (p-values in brackets)

Landfilled waste1999
Landfilled waste 2000

Moran’s I (contiguity matrix,
Queen)
0.0845* (0.0910)
-0.0085 (0.5170)

Moran’s I (proximity matrix,
Euclidean distance)
0.0057 (0.4360)
-0.1029* (0.0860)

Landfilled waste 2002
Landfilled waste 2003

-0.0340 (0.3840)
0.0229 (0.2970)

-0.0550 (0.2840)
-0.0155 (0.4890)

Landfilled waste 2005
Landfilled waste 2006

-0.0390 (0.3360)
0.0828* (0.0930)

-0.0183 (0.4660)
0.0372 (0.2320)

Waste generation 1999
Waste generation 2000

0.9361*** (0.0010)
0.0189 (0.3120)

0.9279***(0.0010)
0.0535 (0.1850)

Waste generation 2002
Waste generation 2003

0.0629 (0.1310)
0.0582 (0.1490)

0.0627 (0.1610)
0.0576 (0.1460)

Waste generation 2005
Waste generation 2006

0.1332** (0.0230)
0.0008 (0.4240)

0.1035* (0.0560)
0.0097 (0.3980)

When we consider waste generation, we find a positive autocorrelation for 1999 and 2005, which is
nevertheless more significant (and invariant with respect to the weight matrix) with respect to the
case of landfilled waste. However, the other years do not present spatial dependence, although the
signs are always positive. The positive spatial autocorrelation in the case of waste generation for
1999 and 2005, and the general absence of spatial autocorrelation for landfilled waste, can be
explored in the context of the map of the local clusters. A local indicators of spatial association
(LISA) cluster map indicates significant cases and types of spatial association based on the LISA,
which shows high-high (red) and low-low (dark blue) clusters (i.e. positive spatial autocorrelation)
and high-low (bright orange) and low-high (blue) clusters (i.e. negative spatial autocorrelation).
Figures 5 and 6 show the respective LISA cluster maps for landfilled waste and waste generation.
Figure 6 shows two very big clusters located in the North and in the South of Italy, which explain
the strong positive spatial autocorrelation in 1999 for waste generation. A percentile map for waste
generation in 1999 confirms this (Figure 7).
A possible interpretation of the substantial lack of the spatial autocorrelation in landfilled waste
could be that the policy definition and implementationxxi of landfilling has effectively happened at a
very decentralised level, maybe even at the sub-provincial municipal level. It is provinces not regions
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that ultimately have to manage the waste, often in very flexible ways, and via delegation to
municipalities or consortia of municipalities within the provinces. This could explain why there are
no relevant spatial clustering phenomena in the landfilled waste data: policy decentralisation is very
high for both waste tariffs and effective implementation of landfill tax. We arrive at a somewhat
different conclusion based on the spatial analysis of waste generation. Starting from an initial
situation, the 1999 case, with strong positive spatial dependence, the following years (with the
exception of 2002) present a substantial absence of spatial autocorrelation, which could be related to
a spatial progressive homogenisation in per capita waste generation. Spatial analyses of waste are
quite rare. We believe that the recent find of significant spatial correlation for the UK (Ham, 2009)
regarding recycling rates is related to the different level of analysis - UK local authorities (388). We
cannot conduct analyses at the same level due to data unavailability, but we can assume that the
higher the level of decentralisation analysed, the more likely spatial correlations will arise. From a
policy perspective, both province and municipality levels are of interest, as they represent
governance at the various levels and vary across regions. What we find is that the current de facto
situation, which originated in the evolution of this complex decentralised waste system, is
characterised by provinces acting as the ‘waste economic-policy jurisdiction’, with eventual
homogeneity of actions and performance within provinces. Whether this ‘positive’ empirical fact fits
with the normative elements related to efficiency is a matter for further research, which should
analyse local costs and benefits for this environmental local public good, and economies of scale, in
the spirit of Oates and Buchanan’s models of optimal decentralisation of local public/club goods.
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Figure 5. LISA (local indicators of spatial association) cluster maps for per capita landfilled waste (1999 and 2006)

Figure 6. LISA (local indicators of spatial association) cluster maps for per capita waste generation (1999 and 2006)
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Figure 7. Percentile maps for per capita waste generation (1999 and 2006)
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4.4 Convergence
We carry next to examine convergence in waste generation and landfill diversion trends. This is an
instrumental exercise aimed at assessing whether at least the different performance in the northern
and southern regions, a hot issue for Italy and other federal states in the EU, is showing some
convergence. The topic of convergence is seldom applied to the waste realm, although the UK study
by Ham (2009) brings together spatial and convergence analyses. She finds that, as far as recycling
rates are concerned, in a quite similar environment characterised by regional disparities, there are
both convergence and spatial effects. Interest in convergence studies is increasing due to increased
interest in the field of environmental economics, especially in relation to air polluting emissions.
Among these studies, List (1999) performs convergence tests on a long panel dataset of sulphur
dioxides and nitrogen oxide emissions in the US, and finds evidence of convergence. Strazicich and
List (2003) using data on carbon dioxide emissions in 21 OECD countries, find strong and robust
evidence of convergence. Aldy (2006) performs a series of tests on carbon dioxide emissions in
period 1960-2000 in two different samples, a 23 OECD country sample and a wider 88 world
country dataset. He finds significant convergence for the OECD sample, but insignificant
convergence for the other sample. Barassi et al. (2007), perform a series of advanced panel root unit
tests on a sample of OECD countries for the period 1950-2002 but find no evidence of
convergence in the amount of carbon dioxide produced per capita. In all these studies, the concept
of convergence adopted is taken from the more traditional analyses of income convergence
originally introduced by growth economists (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 2003). The more usual test
in this field, know as β-convergence, refers to what is generally called absolute convergence, and is
aimed at checking whether the poor countries are “catching up” with the richer ones. In the
emissions context this means checking whether the pattern of emissions in the less-polluting
countries is increasing more quickly than in other countries. If so, we can say that emissions are
converging to the same level among countries. If not, then the rate of emissions in the more
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polluting countries would be increasing. Such analyses are common in emissions studies because of
the implication of their findings for climate change policy makers and modellers of climate change.
In our case a series of convergence test should provide a deeper understanding of the waste
sector. We have seen that, for the whole of Italy, there is an overall trend in waste management
characterised by a process of relative delinking for waste generation and absolute delinking for total
waste landfilled. In this context of a major regulatory change, a convergence test should help to
understand how the process is developing and whether the reorganization of waste management in
Italy is producing greater convergence or is widening the differences among provinces. In particular
it will show whether amounts of waste generated are increasing, and whether the growth in different
areas is converging or whether more the amounts of waste in waste-intensive provinces are growing
more quickly. Furthermore, testing for the amount of waste landfilled should tell us whether the
process of landfill diversion over the last decade is being driven by a few big provinces or is
occurring across the whole country.
In order to test for convergence in our panel, we estimate a regression where the dependent
variable is given by the variation in the growth of our log dependent variable against the lagged
variable itself. This allows us to test whether the rate of change of the variable at time t depends by
its previous value. In other words, a significant and negative coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable means that we are in the presence of convergence. Furthermore, in order to avoid problems
of endogeneity based on the nature of the regression, the lagged dependent variable is instrumented
with the lag for the previous year.xxii The specification is shown below and the regression results are
summarised in Table 5.

(2) log wasteit – log wasteit-1 = αit + β log wasteit-1 + εi
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Table 5: Convergence, Waste generation and landfilled Waste
l.MSW-GEN
l.LAND-WASTE
CONSTANT
MODEL
Davidson-MacKinnon test

Waste Generated
-0.3920663***
Not present/estimated
IV FEM (cluster correction)
0.0158

Waste Landfilled
-0.6080219***
3.405887***
FEM (cluster correction)
0.5457

From a methodological point of view, both the previous regressions were estimated using a fixed
effect model with cluster correction for heteroskedasticity. Moreover, based on the results of the
Davidson-MacKinnon test for exogeneity, we preferred an OLS estimator of the same equation for
the waste landfilled analysis.
The two analyses show similar results: the coefficients - significant and with a negative sign prove the presence of convergence in both cases. The only important difference is in the value of
the coefficient, which can be interpreted as the speed of convergence. This difference tells us that
the process of convergence is occurring more quickly for landfill diversion. This is a positive signal,
and to some extent mitigates the current dramatic difference between southern and northern regions
in terms of average waste management and waste disposal performance, although local problem in
Naples and Sicily remain. Nevertheless, the existence of a gap, even if consistent in part with
different socio-economic conditions, highlights the need for great attention to achieving
convergence of waste performances in the current transition towards a more decentralised policy
scenario.

5. Conclusions
Waste disposal is becoming increasingly problematic and important in policy terms in the EU, and
especially in Italy given this country’s high policy decentralisation and wide structural difference in
terms of income between southern and northern regions. This paper analyses the process of
delinking in waste generation and landfilled waste trends through the consideration of economic,
structural, policy and spatial factors.
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The analysis of the core income-waste generation relationship do not support the evidence of
negative elasticity, even at higher income levels. Despite the fact that even a decade of waste
(management) policy has not affected the relationship in a substantial way, we take it to be a positive
sign that elasticity is below unity, which points to the presence of at least relative delinking.
Moreover, population density drives up waste generation as well: economies of scale in waste
management do not exert potential impacts in densely urbanised areas. This result confirms the
major findings in the literature.
In terms of landfill diversion dynamics, the observed decoupling between economic growth and
landfilling was expected, but is probably not sufficient per se if waste generation (the scale)
continues to increase: it is driven by a mix of economic-structural factors, such as population
density, which here is weighted more heavily than mere income: local opportunity costs and landfill
externalities, which are higher in heavily populated areas, matter in shaping waste policies and local
commitment to landfill diversion. This may be food for though for regional and development
policies at local level and useful insight for assessments of the income-environment relationship.
Income plays a role in driving different regional waste performance, but rather indirectly, although
opportunity costs have a more direct effect through their income dynamics, such as in the simplistic
interpretation of the income-environment relationship.
It is not only structural factors that are relevant. Although landfill tax is not shown to be a
significant driver of the phenomenon, as in other EU countries (policy package may matter more)
the set of waste management instruments, such as separated collection, and the accompanying tariffbased evolution of local waste services, implemented both within privatised and public owned
utilities, are associated with a significant negative effect on landfilled waste. It is worth noting that,
as far as waste management is concerned, robust evidence of ‘policy endogeneity’ is found: the
dynamics is one where richer provinces (income drivers local preferences for green public goods,
local authorities receive more taxes to fund such goods) implement stricter and more costly waste
management systems, that have (so far) not generated absolute delinking, but are aimed at that and
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could soon revert the waste-income relationships. Such endogenous dynamics are of high interest in
contexts where the central state fully delegates all the management to local levels of governance.
Given the strong north-south heterogeneity, the endogeneity of waste management commitment
and the transition towards highly decentralised policy implementation, we analysed spatial
dependence regarding provinces, the effective level of waste management decision making.
Landfilled waste data do not present evidence of spatial autocorrelation. In addition, if there were
any spatial phenomena regarding waste performance, they disappeared during the transition since
2000 to a new waste management system. Thus, it is reasonable also to argue that neighbouring
provinces are unlikely to exchange experience, and thus also unlikely to influence each others’
policies and waste landfill habits. This substantial lack of the spatial autocorrelation might be due to
the fact that, as acknowledged by experts and anecdotal evidence, the definition and implementation
of landfill policy effectively has happened at a very sub-provincial decentralised (even municipal)
level. However, we can draw a different conclusion based on the spatial analysis of waste generation.
Starting from an initial situation with a significant and positive spatial dependence before the
effective introduction of economic based management instruments, the years after 2000 show a
substantial absence of spatial autocorrelation for landfilled waste, which could be related to a
spatially progressive homogenisation in per capita waste generation, and no clustering at regional or
interregional levels. The stronger association of waste generation and income levers, and the lower,
with respect to landfilling, effect of waste management instruments and local opportunity costs,
might explain this result.
Another conclusion relevant to environmental policy making, is related to the possible (huge)
difference between a country’s average performance and its negative and positive outliers, a situation
that may be exacerbated by environmental externalities tackled through a very high policy and
management decentralisation. The evidence provided in this paper would seem to suggest that
divergence is a risk and a possibility that we need to tackle: accompanying the lack of economic
convergence experienced by Italy over recent decades, there is an income-driven divergence in
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socio-economic and institutional performance. The introduction and the enforcement of ‘new’ waste
management options (tariffs, separated collection) are stronger and more concentrated in the
northern regions. The southern and northern regions are characterised by vicious and virtuous
circles related respectively to income and waste policy implementation. The risk of overall
divergence is evident: this could lead to more and more frequent local crises related to waste, which
would undermine national performance and require national intervention in terms of financing, as
the costs of cleaning up would be beyond the individual regions ‘responsible’ for this dire
performance.
Though our analysis finally shows that there is some convergence in action for both waste
generation and landfill diversion (the latter a more positive fact) along this dynamic evolutionary
process, attention should be paid in managing such a highly decentralised process of managing
waste. If its is true that the process of landfill diversion seems occurring in a scenario in which the
relatively less performing provinces (in the South) have started to reduce the gap (with the North),
and this represents a small light at the end of the tunnel, which should be taken as a stimulus to a
further strengthening of regional convergence, notwithstanding structural socio-economic
differences that explain different levels of waste performance, but along a converging path, on the
other hand in terms of waste generation this confirms previous results. Environmental policies have
not been able to promote a reduction in the amount of waste generated, and those provinces that
were less waste-intensive, since 2000 have registered even higher growth rate.
Finally, we could say that this is partly an old tale: although policy decentralisation is preferable in
theory, given that it may ensure higher coherence with the local preferences for defined public
goods and the fact that different regions are experiencing different stages of economic development,
the basic and we think misleading interpretation of environmental Kuznets curves that income
drives environmental performance, does not take account of the fact that along these dynamics
income, from social, economic and political perspectives, helps the financing and enforcement of
stronger and better environmental management and policy efforts. This is a possible drawback of a
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strongly decentralised policy process and should provide food for thought in terms of future
research, and future policy in the EU and US and countries in the initial phases of waste policy
efforts.

32
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper417

32

Nicolli et al.: Waste Generation and Landfill Diversion Dynamics: Decentrali

APPENDIX:

Table A.1: Further tests in cases of endogeneity. Waste generation.
SEP-COLLECT

CONSTANT

TAR-POP^

IV Estimation
(VA as
instrument)

Using the first
lag of the
variable

IV Estimation
(Lags as
instruments)

IV Estimation
(VA as
instrument)

3.988506***

2.620096***

2.713269***

9.425374***

0.1981252***

0.1649368**

VA
DENSITY

0.4027496***

0.314313***

0.3484448***

SEP-COLLECT

0.0701332***

0.0303273***

0.0492306***

TAR-MUN^

Using the first lag
of the variable

IV Estimation
(Lags as
instruments)

IV Estimation
(VA as
instrument)

Using the first
lag of the
variable

IV Estimation
(Lags as
instruments)

0.6674112***

0.9528525

8.875068***

0.3411253

0.4274984

0.4169227***

0.3955181***

0.4292366***

0.422698***

-0.6357739***

0.2926517***

0.2769891***

-0.5275321**

0.3332481***

0.3286678***

0.007308***

0.0003701**

0.0006074***
0.011831***

0.0001507

0.0002543

TAR-POP^
TAR-MUN^
Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.

R2

presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.

Table A.2: Further tests in cases of endogeneity. Landfilled Waste.
SEP-COLLECT

CONSTANT

TAR-POP^

TAR-MUN^

IV Estimation
(VA as
instrument)

Using the first
lag of the
variable

IV Estimation
(Lags as
instruments)

IV Estimation
(VA as
instrument)

Using the first
lag of the
variable

IV Estimation
(Lags as
instruments)

IV Estimation
(VA as
instrument)

Using the first
lag of the
variable

IV Estimation
(Lags as
instruments)

4437.886***

4021.835***

4196.6***

1061.97

7638.628***

7250.425

3576.104***

7041.181***

5764.787***

-408.9492***

-379.8387***

-394.9188***

-298.2929*

-134.0417

-646.2248***

-624.9235***

-555.3378***

-487.6524***

-4.537735***

-0.5033163

-0.8260642*

VA
DENSITY

-778.8923***

SEP-COLLECT

-43.5478***

-708.3027***
-24.35552***

TAR-POP^

-734.2649***

-630.0055***

-38.36197**

-2.227458***
(1)
Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. R2 presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.
TAR-MUN^

-2.243737***

-3.758221***
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i Although northern Italy is rapidly evolving towards high levels of recycling, composting and incineration, the average
for the country is still dominated by landfill, confirmed by the dramatic news from areas, such as Campania, in the
South. However, even some northern regions are suffering from landfill criticalities given the increasing scarcity of land
in physical and economic terms (opportunity costs) and the non-decreasing, at best stabilised trends in waste generation.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the current differences in waste management and disposal across Italian provinces (other
depictions are available upon requests for incineration and waste generation and tariff diffusions). For a ‘regional
politics’ oriented analysis of the recent history of the economic and institutional failures in the Neapolitan and Sicilian
waste systems see Pasotti (2009a,b).
ii
Our data source, to our knowledge, is one of the richest - at least at EU level and the Italian case presents high
heterogeneous (and federal) socio-economic and policy situations similar to other EU and non-EU countries.
iii The waste management tariff was introduced by Italian law no. 22/1997, and was meant to replace the former waste
management tax; however, the latter still applies in many Italian municipalities because the provisions of law 22/1997
allow the transition to be quite gradual. The old tax was calculated on the basis of size of household living space,
whereas the tariff is based on the principles of full-cost pricing of waste management services. Effective implementation
of the tariff system nevertheless is highly dependent on local policy decisions and practices and in part is down to the
choice of the municipality. We note that implementation is heterogeneous even across areas with similar incomes and
similar social economic variables, and may depend on the level of policy commitment. The shift from tax to tariff should
also capture the incentive effect of the latter, although the impact on waste generation, if any, is not visible in the short
term.
iv This is coherent with EU environmental policies, which, in theory, should be rooted firmly in the polluter pays
principle. It should be noted that the European court of Justice has been forced to pronounce a legal decision statement
(probably during 2009) on the coherence of such a tax with the PPP, following a legal procedure activated by a hotel
owner who sued against the tax through the administrative court of the Campania Region (‘TAR’), claiming that that tax
was/is based and calculated on parameters such as square meters, but also business income. Legally and also
substantially, the problem is one of whether the old tax can achieve the objectives determined by the EU waste
legislation. An EU decision in favour of full coherence with PPP could accelerate the transition towards the tariff, which
was been halted repeatedly on the basis of unclear instruction from central government in recent years. Note also that
many municipalities are not in favour of the new tariff, fearing loss of revenue. This is critical to a clear understanding of
the current stalled situation.
v It is well known that this flaw may depend on the availability of average instead of marginal policy figures.
vi As far as landfill diversion is concerned, and considering that the dataset presents some zero values (5 of the 103
provinces observed in 1999-2006 have no MSW landfill sites and others, e.g. Milan, closed their landfill sites at a certain
point resulting in zero values after a certain year) the model specification is of a linear-log type. Further analyses may
implement two stage Heckman regressions to account for the discrete choice of having (or not) a landfill facility, and for
how much waste is to be landfilled.
vii We use Stata, specifically the option ‘cluster’ after the ‘FE LSDV estimation’. In this way we use the
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance and we allow observations that are not time invariant within groups,
although they must be independent between groups. This means that we consider that Var(εit) = σ2εit
i=1,.., N,
t=1,…,T, and that Cov(εit, εis) ≠ 0 t ≠ s.
viii Non-corrected estimates are available; note that they differ very little, apart from the non-linearity of the incomeenvironment relationship which disappears when corrected. The results are coherent.
ix A non-linear specification (not shown) was tested, but the squared VA term was never significant.
x We also test for geographical dummies, inserting North, South, Island dummies against the ‘centre of Italy’ benchmark.
The only significant dummies are North and South, which both have a negative coefficient. While we might expect this
for the North, the evidence for the South dummy is less intuitive given the high frequency of poor waste performance in
southern regions. Note, however, that here we deal with waste generation, not management. Also, the evidence is
coherent with APAT data, which show that the centre regions (especially the touristic Tuscany) are associated with the
highest levels of waste generation per capita.
xi This may be scope for further research.
xii Overall, TAR-POP is more significant than TAR-MUN. This could mean a higher impact at provincial level of new
policy diffusion in terms of population, rather than municipalities. What matters is its implementation in the largest cities
where incomes are probably higher on average, evoking the latent endogeneity of the dynamics.
xiii Elasticity estimates deriving from the log-log estimations (not shown for reasons of space) covering provinces with at
least one open landfill, are available upon request.
xiv The highly significant role of density as a covariate, improving the overall fit of the model, is underlined in the UK
study by Ham (2009).
xv Interviews with waste experts in some of the Italian regions confirmed that the tax is aimed mainly at collecting
revenue (and eventually earmarking it for waste services and landfill sites ex post re-qualification), not at changing
relative prices. However, some regions have not implemented strategies for its prioritisation and use the revenue to
finance other public services. This is of major concern in terms of improving the effectiveness of this instrument in the
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future through greater enforcement and the introduction of real ‘revenue recycling’ elements into the system. Finally,
landfill sites operate in a very monopolistic kind of market, where associated rents (deriving from gate fees and rather
inelastic demand) are a real constraint to a major movement of waste from landfill.
xvi
Formally, spatial autocorrelation is present when spatial randomness is violated. Generally, we have spatial
randomness when:
 values observed at a location do not depend on the values observed at neighbouring locations;
 the observed spatial pattern of values is equally as likely as any other spatial pattern;
the location of values may be altered without affecting the information content of the data.
xvii The global Moran’s I provides a global autocorrelation statistic that result in a single measure of spatial autocorrelation
for an attribute in a region as a whole (in our case, Italy). The local Moran’s I provides local spatial autocorrelation
statistics, which, for each unit in the region (in our case a single province), result in the unit's tendency for an attribute
value that is correlated with the values in nearby areas. In our analysis we are interested in the global measure. However
the LISA cluster maps (figures 5 and 6) show evidence for the local (provincial) indicators.
xviii Even when the weights are based on simple contiguity, different weights structures may result for the same spatial
layout. The options are referred to as the rook case (only common boundaries), the bishop case (only common vertices)
and the queen case (both boundaries and vertices). In our case, with Italian provincial boundaries, the queen and the rook
methods end up with the same weight matrix.
xix The neighbours are contiguous spatial units. For ease of interpretation and to make the parameter estimates between
different models more comparable, the spatial weights matrix is typically row-standardised.
xx When the same variables are used to compute a general distance metric such as included in the model, the weights are
unlikely to remain exogenous. Consequently, the resulting model specification becomes highly non-linear with
endogeneity that must be instrumented out.
xxi The transition towards the tariff formally began with the 1999 EU landfill Directive (ratified by Italy in 2003).
xxii
A Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity for a fixed effects panel data model was conducted to check whether an
OLS estimator for the same equation would yield consistent estimates.
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